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“IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF COMITY”: 
PRESIDENT BUSH’S MEMORANDUM IN MEDELLIN v. DRETKE 
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE 
PRESIDENT’S ABILITY TO ENFORCE THE ICJ’S AVENA 
JUDGMENT AT THE STATE LEVEL 
INTRODUCTION 
During its 2005 term, the Supreme Court of the United States heard oral 
arguments in Medellin v. Dretke.1  Jose Ernesto Medellin, a Mexican citizen on 
death row in Texas for the 1993 rape and murder of two Houston teenage girls, 
asked the Court to review his conviction and death sentence.2  Medellin alleged 
that his conviction should be overturned because he had not been informed at 
the time of his arrest of his right under Article 36(1) of the Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations3 to contact the Mexican consulate and seek consular 
assistance in his defense.4 
Medellin was arrested in Houston in connection with the two murders in 
June 1993.5  At the time of his arrest, Medellin told the arresting officers that 
he was born in Mexico.6  Before trial, he also told Texas authorities that he was 
not a U.S. citizen.7  Nevertheless, Medellin was not informed of his right to 
seek assistance from the Mexican consulate.8  In September 1994, Medellin 
was convicted and sentenced to death.9  Mexican authorities did not learn of 
Medellin’s case until 1997, shortly after his death sentence was affirmed on 
direct appeal.10 
Shortly thereafter, with the aid of the Mexican consulate, Medellin sought 
a writ of state habeas corpus based on the violation of his rights under the 
 
 1. 544 U.S. 660 (2005). 
 2. Id. at 662. 
 3. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36(1), Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 
U.N.T.S. 261 (ratified by the President of the United States Nov. 12, 1969). 
 4. Medellin, 544 U.S. at 662. 
 5. Brief of Applicant Jose Ernesto Medellin at 7, Ex parte Medellin, No. AP-75207, 2006 
WL 3302639 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 15, 2006) [hereinafter Brief of Applicant]. 
 6. Id. at 7–8. 
 7. Id. at 8. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Brief of Applicant, supra note 5, at 9. 
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Vienna Convention.11  The Texas trial court denied the writ, finding that 
Medellin’s failure to raise the issue at his state criminal trial procedurally 
barred him from raising it in a state habeas petition.12  The Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals also denied federal habeas relief on the ground that Medellin had 
failed to litigate the issue at the state level.13 
In Medellin, Medellin asked the Supreme Court to overturn the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision and to review his conviction and death sentence, despite his 
procedural default.14  Specifically, Medellin predicated his claim for relief on 
an earlier decision by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Mexico v. United 
States (the Avena case).15  In Avena, Mexico sued the United States on behalf 
of itself and fifty-four Mexican nationals on death row throughout the United 
States, including Medellin.16  Mexico alleged that the plaintiffs’ convictions 
had all been obtained in violation of their rights under Article 36(1) of the 
Vienna Convention because none of them were notified at the time of their 
original detention of their right to contact the Mexican consulate.17 
Prior to Avena, the ICJ had interpreted Article 36(1) of the Vienna 
Convention to confer on citizens an individual right to receive consular access, 
in addition to a signatory nation’s right to be notified that its citizen has been 
detained.18  In Avena, the ICJ went one step further and concluded that a 
foreign national convicted in violation of his Article 36(1) rights is entitled to 
judicial review of his conviction and sentence to determine whether that 
violation prejudiced his case; the ICJ advised the United States to provide such 
review for the Avena plaintiffs.19  The ICJ also found that procedural default 
rules, whereby “a defendant who . . . fails to raise[] a legal issue at trial will 
 
 11. Id. at 9–10. 
 12. Id. at 10. 
 13. Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 663 (2005). 
 14. Id. at 661–62. 
 15. See id. at 662–63; Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 
43 I.L.M. 581 (I.C.J. Mar. 31, 2004). 
 16. Avena, 43 I.L.M. at 588.  Although Mexico originally sued on behalf of itself and fifty-
four of its citizens, it later adjusted its claim so that the final Avena decision involved only fifty-
two Mexican nationals, including Jose Ernesto Medellin.  Id. at 592.  Governor Brad Henry of 
Oklahoma subsequently commuted the death sentence of Avena plaintiff Osvaldo Torres to life 
without parole on May 13, 2004.  See Torres v. State, 120 P.3d 1184, 1186 (Okla. Crim. App. 
2005). 
 17. Avena, 43 I.L.M. at 589. 
 18. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 494 (June 27) (“Based on the text of 
these provisions, the Court concludes that Article 36, paragraph 1, creates individual rights, 
which, by virtue of Article 1 of the Optional Protocol, may be invoked in this Court by the 
national State of the detained person.”). 
 19. Avena, 43 I.L.M. at 615.  The Avena court added that “the legal consequences of this 
breach have to be examined and taken into account in the course of review and reconsideration.  
The Court considers that it is the judicial process that is suited to this task.”  Id. at 619. 
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generally not be permitted to raise it in future proceedings,”20 should be 
suspended for the Avena plaintiffs.21  This ruling was based on the ICJ’s 
finding that procedural default had prevented many foreign nationals, such as 
Medellin, from obtaining judicial review.22  Finally, the ICJ found that the state 
clemency process, review of sentences by a panel of prison authorities, is not 
sufficient and that foreign nationals are entitled to judicial review.23 
Rather than either affirming or reversing the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme 
Court dismissed the writ issued in Medellin as improvidently granted.24  The 
majority relied heavily on a 2005 memorandum from President George W. 
Bush to Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez.25  In the memorandum, President 
Bush directed the states to comply with the ICJ’s decision and review the 
sentences of the Avena plaintiffs, including Jose Ernesto Medellin.26  Citing 
this memorandum, the Medellin Court found it likely “that the Texas courts 
will provide Medellin with the review he seeks.”27  Therefore, the Supreme 
Court concluded that it would be premature to rule on his case.28 
The Medellin decision does not address whether state procedural default 
rules are preempted by the President’s order.  However, the Court’s decision to 
 
 20. Id. at 613 (quoting Mexico’s unchallenged definition of the American procedural default 
rule). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 618.  The Avena court added, 
“If the foreign national did not raise his Article 36 claim at trial, he may face procedural 
constraints [i.e., the application of the procedural default rule] on raising that particular 
claim in direct or collateral judicial appeals . . . . As a result, a claim based on the 
violation of Article 36 . . . however meritorious in itself, could be barred in the courts of 
the United States . . . .” 
Id. at 617 (quoting testimony regarding U.S. criminal procedure) (emphasis removed). 
 23. Id. at 619. 
 24. Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 662 (2005). 
 25. Id. at 663–64.  Although the majority apparently deferred to the President’s 
memorandum, the principal dissent in Medellin questioned the President’s authority to issue such 
an order.  See id. at 673 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting with disfavor the majority’s decision to 
dismiss the writ because Medellin might obtain relief in state court proceedings as a result of the 
President’s memorandum, though the majority remained “rightfully agnostic” as to the 
constitutionality of the memorandum). 
 26. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, app. 2: 
Memorandum for the Attorney General, Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (No. 04-5928) 
[hereinafter Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae]. 
I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution 
and the laws of the United States of America, that the United States will discharge its 
international obligations under the decision . . . Mexico v. United States of America . . . by 
having State courts give effect to the decision in accordance with general principles of 
comity in cases filed by the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in that decision. 
Id.  (citation omitted). 
 27. Medellin, 544 U.S. at 666. 
 28. Id. at 666–67. 
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send Medellin’s case back to the Texas courts, which had previously denied 
further review on the grounds of procedural default, suggests this conclusion.29  
This Comment will address several questions raised but not answered by 
Medellin.  Is the President’s memorandum binding on the judiciary so that state 
courts must review the convictions of the Avena plaintiffs regardless of state 
procedural default rules?  If the President’s memorandum is not binding, how 
should state courts handle appeals brought by the Avena plaintiffs in light of 
state procedural default rules and the clemency process?  Finally, what effect 
does the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 
holding that states can apply procedural default to the Article 36(1) claims of 
plaintiffs not named in Avena,30 have on appeals by the Avena plaintiffs? 
One possible answer is that the President’s memorandum is binding—state 
courts must review the Avena plaintiffs’ convictions, regardless of procedural 
default rules, because the President’s memorandum directs them to do so,31 and 
it preempts conflicting state law.32  Arguably, the President has broad Article II 
powers to direct the nation’s foreign affairs, in this case by enforcing the ICJ’s 
Avena decision in state courts.33  Accordingly, state procedural rules that 
interfere with the President’s foreign policy objectives should be nullified by 
his preemptive foreign affairs power.34 
A second possibility is that the President’s memorandum is not binding, 
but that courts must defer to his interpretation of the treaty.35  Arguably, the 
President, as the executor of the laws of the nation, has implicit power to 
interpret those laws when necessary, and state courts are bound by his 
interpretations.36  Therefore, under this rationale, state courts must uphold the 
President’s interpretation of the Vienna Convention in ruling on the Avena 
plaintiffs’ appeals. 
 
 29. See id. at 666; Brief of Applicant, supra note 5, at 10. 
 30. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006).  For reasons that will be discussed 
infra Part IV, the author believes that Sanchez-Llamas may not extend to the Avena plaintiffs, 
and, therefore, does not foreclose the issues raised by this Comment.  Nonetheless, Part IV of this 
Comment will refute the Supreme Court’s decision in Sanchez-Llamas. 
 31. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 26, at app. 2. 
 32. Id. at 44–46. 
 33. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 34. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 26, at 44–46 (arguing that the 
Court has consistently upheld Executive branch dominance over foreign affairs, and noting that 
executive agreements with other nations preempt conflicting state law). 
 35. John Yoo, Politics as Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of Powers, 
and Treaty Interpretation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 851, 870 (2001) (reviewing FRANCES FITZGERALD, 
WAY OUT THERE IN THE BLUE: REAGAN, STAR WARS AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR (2000)). 
 36. Id. 
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Even after Avena and Medellin, the Executive Branch does not read the 
treaty to confer any privately enforceable individual rights.37  According to the 
Executive Branch, although foreign citizens may have individual rights under 
Article 36(1), only foreign nations are entitled under Article 36(2) to a remedy 
for a violation of their citizens’ rights.38  Their citizens have no individually 
enforceable remedy under U.S. domestic law, including judicial review.39  The 
President’s decision to grant review to the Avena plaintiffs did not signal a 
reversal of this position—instead, he made a one-time exception out of 
deference to the ICJ and respect for the international community, which 
applied only to the Avena plaintiffs.40  However, if the President’s 
memorandum is not binding, state courts should disregard the exception (the 
memorandum) and follow the President’s interpretation.  Review should be 
denied because, as the President interprets the treaty, individuals alleging 
violations of Article 36(1) have no remedy under U.S. law.41 
This Comment will first suggest that the President’s memorandum is not 
preemptive and so state courts are not required by his order to review the 
Avena plaintiffs’ convictions where doing so would violate otherwise 
applicable procedural default rules.  However, this Comment will also argue 
that state courts are not bound to uphold the President’s treaty interpretation 
and deny review to the Avena plaintiffs.  Courts also owe deference to the 
ICJ’s interpretation, because the United States specifically ceded jurisdiction to 
the ICJ to interpret the treaty.42  The two interpretations of the President and 
the ICJ are mutually inconsistent, and therefore, courts cannot defer to both.43 
 
 37. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 26, at 22–23 (“The Executive 
Branch has never interpreted the Vienna Convention to give a foreign national a judicially 
enforceable right to challenge his conviction and sentence.”). 
 38. Id. at 23 (“The State Department’s longstanding practice has been to investigate a 
country’s complaint about the absence of notification.  When a violation has been confirmed, the 
State Department has extended a formal apology to that country’s government and sought to 
prevent a recurrence through educational efforts.”). 
 39. Id. at 22–23. 
 40. See id. at app. 2. 
 41. Id. at 22–23. 
 42. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Optional Protocol concerning the 
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 326, 596 U.N.T.S. 487 [hereinafter 
Optional Protocol]. 
 43. See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 43 I.L.M. 
581, 615 (I.C.J. Mar. 31, 2004) (stating that a foreign national deprived of his Article 36(1) rights 
is entitled to an individual remedy under Article 36(2), namely judicial review of his conviction 
and sentence, to determine whether the violation prejudiced his case); LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. 
U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 494 (June 27) (stating that the “clarity of these provisions, viewed in their 
context, admits of no doubt” and that Article 36(1) unequivocally creates individual rights for 
foreign citizens detained abroad to receive consular access and assistance); Brief for United States 
as Amicus Curiae, supra note 26, at 18–30 (discussing the U.S. government’s position that 
Article 36(1) does not create any rights that can be enforced in U.S. courts by an individual 
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Therefore, this Comment will propose a third answer—state courts should 
interpret the treaty on their own and choose to follow the ICJ’s interpretation, 
not out of deference, but because it correctly reflects the meaning behind the 
treaty’s provisions.  The ICJ’s interpretation is supported by the actual text of 
the treaty and ensures that violations of Article 36(1) do not go unanswered.  
State courts should interpret the treaty to confer an individual right to consular 
aid and assistance that is privately enforceable by individuals in U.S. courts.44  
Furthermore, state courts should conclude that judicial review of a foreign 
national’s conviction and sentence for prejudice is the proper remedy for a 
violation of this right, regardless of otherwise applicable state procedural 
default rules.45 
Part I discusses the preemptive weight of the President’s memorandum and 
concludes that states are not bound by it to enforce the Avena judgment, as the 
President does not have the Constitutional power to preempt state law merely 
by issuing a statement of foreign policy.  Part II rejects the notion that courts 
must uphold the President’s interpretation of the treaty.  Part II also argues that 
although there are substantial reasons for deferring to the President’s 
interpretation, there are equally weighty grounds for deferring to the ICJ, and 
courts cannot defer to both.  Part III examines the ICJ’s interpretation and 
concludes that it best effectuates the purposes of Article 36.  Finally, Part IV 
explores the Court’s recent decision in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, and 
concludes that the Court wrongly discarded the ICJ’s interpretation. 
I.  CONSIDERING THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR EXECUTIVE PREEMPTION: 
DOES THE PRESIDENT HAVE AN ARTICLE II POWER TO PREEMPT STATE LAW? 
One possible response for state courts faced with appeals by the Avena 
plaintiffs is to follow the President’s directive and grant review, despite 
otherwise applicable procedural default rules.  Arguably, because the President 
is the nation’s designated leader in foreign affairs, he can prevent states from 
thwarting his foreign policy objectives.46  If the President believes that review 
for the Avena plaintiffs is crucial to national foreign policy interests, state 
courts must abide by his decision, and state procedural default laws that would 
otherwise prevent review must yield.47  However, this argument rests on the 
debatable premise that the President, merely by issuing a national foreign 
policy directive, can create preemptive federal law that nullifies conflicting 
state law.  This Part will argue that the President lacks such lawmaking power. 
 
foreign national and that only foreign nations are entitled to a remedy for violations of Article 
36). 
 44. See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 494. 
 45. See Avena, 43 I.L.M. at 615. 
 46. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 26, at 43–48. 
 47. See id. at 43. 
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The Constitution of the United States does not vest the President with 
unlimited foreign affairs powers.48  Under Article II, the President “shall have 
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties,”49 
to “nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, [to] 
appoint Ambassadors,”50 and to “receive Ambassadors and other public 
Ministers.”51  However, despite the textual limitations imposed by the 
Constitution, the Executive Branch has come to dominate the area of foreign 
affairs, usually with little interference by the other branches of government.52 
Courts and scholars alike have recognized the Executive’s power to act for 
the nation in the international sphere.53  The Supreme Court has routinely 
upheld Executive Branch dominance over foreign affairs, recognizing that 
“[a]lthough the source of the President’s power to act in foreign affairs does 
not enjoy any textual detail, the historical gloss on the ‘executive Power’ 
vested in Article II of the Constitution has recognized the President’s ‘vast 
share of responsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations.’”54 
Therefore, both history and precedent seem to support the President’s 
power to issue a binding order requiring state courts to review appeals by the 
Avena plaintiffs.  The United States government took this position in its amicus 
brief submitted in Medellin.55  The United States urged the Court to dismiss 
Medellin’s petition because the President had already determined that, in the 
interests of foreign policy, with respect to fifty-one individuals, the Avena 
decision should be enforced in state courts.56  Specifically, the government 
argued that President Bush had determined that enforcement of the ICJ’s 
Avena directive was crucial to U.S. foreign policy, in light of the many 
Americans detained abroad, depending for their own well-being on consular 
assistance.57  The government urged the Court to defer to the President’s 
 
 48. U.S. CONST. art II. 
 49. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
 50. Id. (emphasis added). 
 51. Id. art. II, § 3. 
 52. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 40–41 (2d 
ed. 1996). 
 53. Id.  Louis Henkin, a renowned international law scholar, has characterized the expansion 
of the presidential foreign affairs power as follows: “[B]y constitutional exegesis, by inferences 
and extrapolations small and large . . . Presidents have achieved and legitimated an undisputed, 
extensive, predominant . . . ‘foreign affairs power,’ though . . . its scope and content remain less 
than certain.”  Id. 
 54. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
 55. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 26, at 43–48. 
 56. Id. at app. 2. 
 57. See id. at 41. 
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directive and dismiss, rather than independently deciding whether state courts 
were bound by the ICJ’s decision.58 
Relying on the Court’s 2003 decision in American Insurance Association 
v. Garamendi,59 the government pointed out that the Court had consistently 
upheld the President’s power to act independently in the international sphere.60  
The government argued that the President can make executive agreements with 
other countries and that such agreements do not depend for their validity on 
“ratification by the Senate or approval by Congress.”61  Furthermore, these 
agreements have preemptive effect.62  Therefore, the government concluded 
that a President able to make executive agreements “to resolve a dispute with a 
foreign government . . . should be equally free to resolve a dispute with a 
foreign government” by deciding how to comply with the ICJ’s Avena 
decision.63 
In reaching this conclusion, the government relied heavily on Garamendi, 
where the Supreme Court enjoined enforcement of a state law because it 
impermissibly interfered with the President’s conduct of foreign affairs and 
conflicted with an executive agreement between the United States and 
Germany.64 
A. American Insurance Association v. Garamendi: Setting the Stage for 
Executive Foreign Policy Preemption 
In Garamendi, a group of insurers sued the Insurance Commissioner of the 
State of California to prevent enforcement of the 1999 Holocaust Victim 
Insurance Relief Act (HVIRA).65  HVIRA was aimed at compensating 
Holocaust survivors living in California who had been deprived of valid life 
insurance claims during and after World War II.66  HVIRA required all 
insurers operating in California to disclose the details of any policies issued to 
Europeans between 1920 and 1945 by either themselves, a parent, or a 
subsidiary.67  Failure to meet the burdensome disclosure requirements could 
result in the insurer losing its California insurance license.68  In 2000, President 
Clinton and German Chancellor Schröder had addressed the same concern on 
 
 58. See id. at 40–42. 
 59. 539 U.S 396 (2003). 
 60. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 26, at 44–46. 
 61. Id. at 45. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396. 
 65. See id. at 412. 
 66. Id. at 408–09. 
 67. Id. at 409–10. 
 68. Id. at 410. 
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an international level, signing the German Foundation Agreement.69  In the 
agreement, Germany agreed to establish and fund a foundation aimed at 
finding and compensating Holocaust victims for unpaid life insurance claims, 
and President Clinton agreed to argue for dismissal in light of foreign policy 
interests “whenever a German company was sued on a Holocaust-era claim in 
an American court.”70 
The Supreme Court in Garamendi found that California’s HVIRA was 
preempted by the President’s foreign affairs power.71  As a preliminary matter, 
the Court addressed the general notion of foreign affairs preemption, stating: 
There is . . . no question that at some point an exercise of state power that 
touches on foreign relations must yield to the National Government’s policy, 
given the “concern for uniformity in this country’s dealings with foreign 
nations” that animated the Constitution’s allocation of the foreign relations 
power to the National Government in the first place.72 
The Garamendi Court then concluded that HVIRA conflicted with the 
national foreign policy codified in the agreement.73  While President Clinton 
had repeatedly allowed “European governments and companies to volunteer 
settlement funds,”74 the Court found that “California has taken a different tack 
of providing regulatory sanctions to compel disclosure and payment.”75  The 
Court also found that HVIRA posed a significant threat to insurers, given its 
potential to oust a company completely from a significant American market.76  
In doing so, the law chipped away at the President’s ability to negotiate with 
foreign governments by giving him “less to offer and less economic and 
diplomatic leverage.”77  Ultimately, the Court concluded that “the state Act 
stands in the way of [the President’s] diplomatic objectives.”78 
 
 69. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 405–06.  In addition to the German Foundation Agreement 
with the Republic of Germany, the United States negotiated similar agreements with the 
governments of France and Austria.  Id. at 408 n.3.  The agreement with Austria most closely 
paralleled the German Foundation Agreement at issue in Garamendi.  Id.  Specifically, 
Austria agreed to devote a $25 million fund for payment of claims . . . . Austria also 
agreed to “make the lists of Holocaust era policy holders publicly accessible, to the extent 
available.”  The United States Government agreed, in turn, that the settlement fund should 
be viewed as the “exclusive . . . forum” for the resolution of Holocaust-era claims asserted 
against the Austrian Government or Austrian companies. 
Id.  (citation omitted). 
 70. Id. at 405–06. 
 71. Id. at 401. 
 72. Id. at 413. 
 73. Id. at 420. 
 74. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 421 (emphasis added). 
 75. Id. at 423. 
 76. Id. at 423–24. 
 77. Id. at 424. 
 78. Id. at 427. 
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Writing for the four dissenters, Justice Ginsburg failed to perceive an 
express conflict between the state law, which required disclosure of 
information but did not expressly authorize claims against Germany or 
insurance companies, and the national foreign policy, which sought to promote 
the German foundation as the sole arbiter of unpaid Holocaust-era insurance 
claims.79  Finding no express conflict, Justice Ginsburg concluded the majority 
found preemption based solely on “statements by individual members of the 
Executive Branch” that the state law interfered with the President’s conduct of 
foreign affairs.80  Justice Ginsburg argued, “[W]e have never premised foreign 
affairs preemption on statements of that order. . . . We should not do so here 
lest we place the considerable power of foreign affairs preemption in the hands 
of individual sub-Cabinet members of the Executive Branch.”81 
B. The Inherent Dangers of the Garamendi Precedent 
If the Garamendi precedent is accepted, then at first blush, the case for 
executive preemption seems stronger when applied to the facts in Medellin 
than it did when the Court actually found executive preemption in Garamendi.  
As Justice Ginsburg noted in Garamendi, no express conflict existed between 
the California state law and the executive agreements in that case.82  HVIRA 
was purely a disclosure law, while the executive agreements were silent on 
disclosure.83  Instead, the Garamendi Court found preemption based on 
“foreign policy objectives implicit in the executive agreements.”84  By 
contrast, there is a direct conflict between President Bush’s foreign policy 
directive in Medellin and many state procedural default rules.85  President Bush 
has directed state courts to review appeals by the Avena plaintiffs.86  State 
procedural default rules that prevent further review for many Avena plaintiffs 
directly conflict with his order.87  Therefore, under Garamendi, executive 
preemption on the facts in Medellin would seem a foregone conclusion. 
 
 79. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 435 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 80. Id. at 441. 
 81. Id. at 442. 
 82. Id. at 435. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 439 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
 85. For example, see the discussion of Texas state procedural default rules as applied in 
Medellin’s case, infra note 211. 
 86. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 26, at app. 2. 
 87. For an example specifically pertinent to Medellin’s case in the Texas courts, see TEX. 
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071 § 5(a)(1) (preventing litigants from raising an issue in a 
successive habeas petition if they failed to raise the issue in the original petition, unless they can 
meet certain requirements).  Procedural default rules in general, and more specifically, the 
possible consequences such rules will have on appeals brought by the Avena plaintiffs, are 
discussed at length infra Part III.A.2. 
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However, several scholars have argued, and rightly so, that the Garamendi 
precedent is fundamentally flawed.88  At the heart of Garamendi lies the 
assumption that national foreign policy (like the Constitution, treaties, and 
Acts of Congress) is the supreme law of the land and under the Constitution 
can preempt conflicting state law.89  Indeed, the Garamendi Court extended to 
the President previously unheard-of authority: 
No congressional act authorized the executive policy [at issue in Garamendi], 
even implicitly.  Nor did the executive branch negotiate the Foundation 
Agreement as a treaty and present it to the Senate for its advice and 
consent. . . . [T]he President asserted an independent power to oust the state 
law, based solely upon a policy formulated within the executive branch.90 
There are several inherent problems with according preemptive effect to 
executive foreign policy.  First, the idea that executive foreign policy has 
preemptive effect is devastating to the separation of powers doctrine because it 
elevates the Executive to the position of lawmaker.91  Preemptive effect 
implies the weight of legal authority.92  According preemptive affect to the 
President’s memorandum puts President Bush’s statement of foreign policy on 
par with the Constitution, international treaties, and Acts of Congress—it 
becomes a law, rather than a mere policy.93  “[S]eparation of powers meant 
 
 88. See Brannon P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey, American Insurance Association v. 
Garamendi and Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 827 
(2004); David Sloss, International Agreements and the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 1963, 1964 (2003). 
 89. Denning & Ramsey, supra note 88, at 828–29. 
[T]he essence of the decision is that the President, at least in some circumstances, does 
have . . . preemptive power in foreign affairs. . . . The final outcome, however, was that a 
state law fell, not because the law was in itself unconstitutional, but because the executive 
branch disagreed with it as a policy matter.  As the Court itself said, the case was one of 
“preemption by executive conduct.” 
Id. 
 90. Id. at 898. 
 91. Id. at 908.  The argument that executive foreign policy preemption and executive 
lawmaking contradict the intentions of the Framers is further supported by their own writings.  
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison).  Addressing critics of the new Constitution, 
James Madison readily admitted, “The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and 
judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self 
appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”  Id. at 244 
(Bantam ed., 1982).  However, Madison defended the new Constitution as free from such hazards 
to democratic government, noting “[t]he magistrate in whom the whole executive power resides 
cannot of himself make a law, though he can put a negative on every law, nor administer justice in 
person, though he has the appointment of those who do administer it.”  Id. at 245 (emphasis 
added). 
 92. See Denning & Ramsey, supra note 88, at 908. 
 93. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
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that executive power is separated from the legislative power . . . . As a result, 
the Framers placed the preemptive power in the hands of Congress, an 
allocation that followed directly from the basic principles of separation of 
powers.”94 
Additionally, executive foreign policy lacks the democratic characteristics 
that usually accompany preemptive federal law, suggesting the Framers would 
not have intended to make it preemptive.  “[T]he . . . British monarch did not 
have a domestic rulemaking power in support of foreign affairs objectives—
even foreign affairs objectives specified in treaties.  It is hard to imagine that 
the Framers constituted their President with greater powers than the British 
monarch.”95 Under the Supremacy Clause, three types of law—the 
Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties—enjoy the weighty 
status of supreme law and can preempt conflicting state laws.96  These have a 
common underlying element—all are enacted pursuant to some democratic 
process.97  The Constitution was submitted to the people for ratification, and 
amendments today require a similar ratification process by voters in each 
state.98  Acts of Congress are enacted pursuant to a majority vote of both 
Houses, by popularly elected representatives.99  Even treaties, though 
 
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in 
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
 94. Denning & Ramsey, supra note 88, at 908–09. 
 95. Id. at 913. 
 96. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 97. See Denning & Ramsey, supra note 88, at 829.  “The Constitution’s Article VI places 
the power of preemption in the legislative branch by making laws and treaties, but not executive 
decrees, the supreme law of the land.”  Id. 
 98. See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (stating that the Constitution was enacted by the people); U.S. 
CONST. art. V (stating that amendments to the Constitution shall be proposed “whenever two 
thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary” or when the legislatures of two thirds of the states 
call a convention, and shall be ratified “by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, 
or by Conventions in three fourths thereof”). 
 99. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, 
before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve 
he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it 
shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed 
to reconsider it.  If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass 
the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall 
likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a 
Law. 
Id. 
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originally introduced by the President, cannot become law without the 
participation of the Senate.100 
Executive foreign policy stands in stark contrast to these examples of 
democratic lawmaking.  According preemptive effect to executive foreign 
policy ignores the safeguards imposed by the democratic process and enhances 
the power of the Executive Branch.101  As scholars have recognized, if the 
President alone can preempt state law, he has no need to seek the cooperation 
of Congress to further his objectives.102  Instead, “the President’s ability to 
pursue a unilateral foreign policy agenda is enhanced and Congress’ role in 
deciding foreign policy priorities is diminished.”103 
Finally, if executive foreign policy is preemptive, the portion of the 
Supremacy Clause that makes treaties supreme law would be redundant.104  
“[I]f executive foreign policy is preemptive . . . and if treaties reflect executive 
foreign policy (as they surely do), then the Supremacy Clause is unnecessary to 
make them supreme over state law—something that plainly escaped the notice 
of the Framers.”105 
C. Author’s Analysis 
According preemptive weight to President Bush’s memorandum in 
Medellin is even more suspect than the executive preemption in Garamendi.  
In Garamendi, the agreements at issue were formal, published international 
agreements entered into after long sessions of international negotiations.106  By 
contrast, when this Comment was written, the President’s memorandum in 
Medellin had never been published and was only made public as an appendix 
to the United States’ amicus brief.107 
As such, the President’s memorandum demonstrates the dangers inherent 
in an extension of the Garamendi precedent.108  The policy embodied in the 
memorandum was never submitted to the people in any codified way and was 
never “enacted” pursuant to any democratic process.  Yet, if the Garamendi 
precedent is endorsed, this unpublished directive from President Bush to one of 
 
 100. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present 
concur”). 
 101. See Denning & Ramsey, supra note 88, at 829. 
 102. Id. at 905. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 913–14. 
 105. Id. at 914. 
 106. See United States-Germany: Agreement Concerning the Foundation “Remembrance, 
Responsibility and the Future,” July 17, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1298. 
 107. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 26, at app. 2. 
 108. For a discussion of the constitutional problems with the Garamendi precedent, see supra 
Part I.B. 
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his underlings at the Justice Department has the binding force of supreme law 
and can nullify conflicting state procedural default laws enacted pursuant to 
state democratic processes.109  Given these shortcomings, the Garamendi 
precedent should not be embraced as the source of the President’s authority to 
order state court review of the Avena plaintiffs’ appeals. 
II.  “[H]E SHALL TAKE CARE THAT THE LAWS BE FAITHFULLY EXECUTED:”110 
TO WHAT EXTENT MUST STATE COURTS DEFER TO THE PRESIDENT’S 
INTERPRETATION OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION? 
A second possible response for state courts facing appeals by the Avena 
plaintiffs is to deny further review, thereby upholding the President’s 
interpretation of the treaty rather than enforcing his memorandum.  The 
Executive Branch has consistently maintained that the Vienna Convention does 
not create judicially enforceable rights for individuals—even assuming an 
individual foreign national can prove his Article 36(1) rights were violated, he 
is not entitled to an individual remedy, including judicial review.111  The 
 
 109. On at least two other occasions, the Supreme Court has upheld executive preemption 
where state common law conflicted with a formalized executive agreement.  See United States v. 
Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230–31 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331–32 (1937).  
Pink and Belmont both involved the Litvinov Agreement, an executive agreement signed by 
President Roosevelt in 1933, formally recognizing the Soviet government.  Sloss, supra note 88, 
at 1969.  In 1918, the new Soviet government appropriated all privately-held Russian assets, 
including those held by Russian corporations located in the United States.  Id.  In the Litvinov 
Agreement, the Russian government assigned any remaining interest in assets located in the 
United States to the United States government in return for formal recognition.  Id. 
  Belmont and Pink involved claims filed by the United States in New York seeking assets 
assigned to the United States by the Russian government.  Id.  In both cases, the state of New 
York refused to honor the Russian government’s assignment of those assets “as a matter of 
judicial policy” because the assignment resulted from the prior expropriation of private funds.  Id.  
In both cases, the Supreme Court held the executive agreement preempted New York state 
common law, finding President Roosevelt had “decided . . . to accept the validity of the Soviet 
expropriation.”  Id.  Although these cases present a direct conflict more in line with the conflict 
between state procedural default laws and the President’s memorandum in Medellin, these cases 
are also distinguishable because they involved a conflict between state common law and an 
executive agreement.  Id.  In both cases, the Litvinov agreement was found to supersede the 
judicial policies of New York.  Id.  However, the Court was not asked to decide in either case 
whether an executive agreement would also supersede state laws duly enacted by a state 
legislature.  See Pink, 315 U.S. at 221–23; Belmont, 301 U.S. at 327. 
 110. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 111. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 26, at 20.  “The Executive 
Branch has never interpreted the Vienna Convention to give a foreign national a judicially 
enforceable right to challenge his conviction and sentence.”  Id. at 22–23.  The State 
Department’s current process for redressing Article 36(1) violations is limited to issuing a formal 
apology to the foreign national’s home state if the claim is corroborated by independent agency 
investigation.  Id. at 23. 
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President’s decision to order review for the Avena plaintiffs was merely an 
exception to this interpretation and applies only to those plaintiffs.112 
Arguably, the President, as executor of the nation’s laws,113enjoys an 
implicit power to interpret those laws.114  Thus, while state courts are not 
bound to implement his memorandum, state courts must uphold the President’s 
interpretation of the nation’s treaty obligations.  Accordingly, state courts 
should deny further review, because as the President interprets the treaty and 
U.S. domestic law, an individual foreign national has no judicially enforceable 
remedy for a violation of his Article 36(1) rights.115 
However, as in Garamendi, this argument is predicated on an underlying 
assumption that has been problematic to scholars—this view tacitly accepts 
that the President has the final power to interpret treaties and that courts owe 
absolute deference to the President’s interpretation.  But, if it is “emphatically 
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,”116 
what role should courts play in treaty interpretation?  Additionally, what 
weight, if any, should state courts accord to the ICJ’s interpretation of the 
Vienna Convention, given the ICJ’s jurisdiction over disputes involving the 
correct interpretation of the treaty?117 
 
The State Department’s experience abroad has been that foreign governments also usually 
address complaints about the failure of notification by investigating and extending 
apologies where appropriate. . . . As of 1999, the State Department was not aware of any 
foreign country that had remedied failures of notification through the criminal justice 
process. 
Id. at 24. 
 112. See id. at app. 2. 
 113. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and 
shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.”). 
 114. See HENKIN, supra note 52, at 50.  “[T]reaties and customary international law . . . are 
also the law of the land, and Presidents have asserted [some] responsibility (and authority) to 
interpret such international obligations and to see that they are ‘faithfully executed,’ even when 
Congress has not enacted implementing legislation.”  Id. 
 115. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 26, at 22–23. 
 116. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803): 
If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.  So 
if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a 
particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, 
disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the 
court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case.  This is of the 
very essence of judicial duty. 
Id. at 177–78. 
 117. See Optional Protocol, supra note 42, at art. I (“Disputes arising out of the interpretation 
or application of the Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice and may accordingly be brought before the Court by an application made by any 
party to the dispute being a Party to the present Protocol.”). 
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A. Making the President’s Case: Why The Judiciary Might be Bound to 
Uphold the President’s Interpretation 
Professor John Yoo has argued that the Executive Branch alone is 
empowered to interpret treaties, and the judiciary is bound to follow those 
interpretations.118  According to Professor Yoo, no political branch is expressly 
vested under the Constitution with the power of treaty interpretation, but 
Article II implicitly vests the Executive Branch with interpretive power.119  To 
support his conclusion, Professor Yoo notes that although treaties hinge on the 
advice and consent of the Senate, the Framers placed the treaty power in 
Article II, among the powers of the Executive.120  This “indicates that the 
power to make treaties, and by extension interpret them, remains an executive 
one.”121 
Additionally, Professor Yoo argues, the only reason the Framers did not 
expressly grant the exclusive power of treaty interpretation to the Executive is 
because the Executive’s authority in that area was uncontested when the 
Constitution was written.122 “[M]aking and interpreting treaties . . . was 
traditionally considered an executive function by Anglo-American 
constitutional theory of the eighteenth century.”123  Therefore, Yoo concludes, 
the Framers assumed that the Executive’s exclusive power to interpret treaties 
was a foregone conclusion and did not feel the need to spell it out.124 
Finally, Professor Yoo argues, the Executive Branch is best suited to the 
task of treaty interpretation because the Executive dominates foreign affairs 
anyway and has “structural abilities to wield power quickly, effectively and in 
a unitary manner.”125  Thus, the President enjoys more legitimacy than judges 
when interpreting treaties because he is a nationally-elected leader vested with 
control over the nation’s foreign affairs.126  Likewise, an active role in the 
treaty process allows the Executive to “read the text of the treaty in line with 
its intentions and harmonize that interpretation with current foreign policy 
demands.”127  By contrast, Yoo argues, judicial interpretations of treaties lack 
legitimacy because judges are neither elected by the people nor specifically 
vested with any powers to make foreign policy.128 
 
 118. Yoo, Politics as Law?, supra note 35, at 870. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Yoo, Politics as Law?, supra note 35, at 870. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 872. 
 126. Id. at 876. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Yoo, Politics as Law?, supra note 35, at 876. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2007] “IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF COMITY” 831 
B. The Death of the Separation of Powers Doctrine: Constitutional Problems 
with Binding the Judiciary to the Executive’s Interpretation 
For several reasons, Professor Yoo’s theory that the judiciary is bound to 
uphold Executive Branch treaty interpretations can be rejected as extreme.  
First of all, Professor Yoo’s interpretation of Article II would render other 
portions of the Constitution redundant.129  Professors Derek Jinks and David 
Sloss reject Professor Yoo’s conclusion that the Constitution does not 
expressly vest any political branch with the power of treaty interpretation.130  
Instead, they argue that under the Constitution, “[t]he power to interpret the 
law is granted primarily, but not exclusively, to the judiciary.”131  Article VI 
recognizes treaties as supreme law and states that “the Judges in every State 
shall be bound thereby.”132  Article III extends judicial power to treaties.133  
Taken together, these provisions expressly grant at least some powers of treaty 
interpretation to the judiciary.134  However, these references to the treaty power 
of the judiciary would be unnecessary if Article II gave the President the 
exclusive power to interpret treaties.135 
Likewise, Professor Yoo’s interpretation gives little meaning to the 
Senate’s role in the treaty process.136  Under the Constitution, the Senate 
 
 129. Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 
CORNELL L. REV. 97, 195 (2004). 
 130. Id. at 195–96.  As Professors Jinks and Sloss point out, the extent of the President’s 
power of treaty interpretation, as well as the limitations on that power, have been codified in the 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States: “Courts in the United States 
have final authority to interpret an international agreement . . . but will give great weight to an 
interpretation made by the Executive Branch.”  Id. at 194 n.507 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 326(2) (1987)).  Therefore, although 
they concede that the President’s interpretation is entitled to some deference, the authors reject 
Yoo’s argument for an exclusive executive branch power of treaty interpretation.  Id. at 194–95.  
“Yoo’s argument is flawed . . . because it assumes that the power to interpret treaties, in its 
entirety, is an ‘unenumerated executive power.’”  Id. at 195. 
 131. Id. at 195. 
 132. U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
 133. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under their Authority”). 
 134. Jinks & Sloss, supra note 129, at 195. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Michael P. Van Alstine, The Judicial Power and Treaty Delegation, 90 CAL. L. REV. 
1263, 1277 (2002).  Van Alstine adds that the result of vesting sole interpretive powers in the 
executive, and thereby marginalizing the role of the Senate, is to leave “the very content of the 
law . . . subject to the fleeting whims of executive-branch officials.”  Id. at 1278. 
  In The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton viewed the roles of both the Executive and the 
Senate as crucial to the treaty process.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 75 (Alexander Hamilton).  
Defending the Framers’ decision to place the treaty-making power with the Executive Branch, 
Hamilton pointed to the Executive’s unique capability for swift and decisive action: “The 
qualities elsewhere detailed, as indispensable in the management of foreign negotiations, point 
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retains the power to advise the President and to consent to a treaty before it is 
enacted.137  “If, subsequent to the Senate’s advice and consent . . . the President 
had a unilateral, unreviewable power to interpret (and reinterpret) it, the careful 
cooperation between the executive and legislative branches prescribed by the 
Constitution becomes meaningless.”138 
Finally, the argument that the placement of the treaty-making power in 
Article II also gives the President an implicit power of treaty interpretation is 
inconsistent with the doctrine of separation of powers.139  “[T]he Supreme 
Court long ago established that the initial power to create law does not include 
the subsequent power to interpret it.”140  To illustrate, though Congress enjoys 
power under the Constitution to pass legislation, the Supreme Court has 
unequivocally rejected attempts to extend congressional power to interpreting 
legislation.141  In like manner, though President Bush enjoys the power under 
the Constitution to negotiate treaties, this should not lead to the conclusion that 
he also has the power to bind the judiciary to his interpretation of those 
treaties.142 
C. The Judicial Power of Treaty Interpretation and the Arguments Against 
Judicial Deference to the Executive Branch and the ICJ 
Even the government in Medellin stopped short of arguing that the 
judiciary was bound to uphold the President’s interpretation of the Vienna 
Convention; instead, the government argued the President’s interpretation was 
“entitled to great weight.”143  Therefore, the question remains: What deference, 
if any, should state courts accord to the Executive Branch interpretation of the 
Vienna Convention? 
In practice, courts throughout the United States have often deferred to the 
Executive Branch in matters touching on foreign affairs.144 
The reasons for deference are not often articulated and are rarely examined, but 
high among them appears to be some sense that the governmental act in 
 
out the Executive as the most fit agent in those transactions.”  Id. at 380 (Bantam ed., 1982).  
However, Hamilton also saw reason to curb the powers of the Executive by giving the Legislative 
Branch a role in the treaty process, noting “the operation of treaties as laws, plead strongly for the 
participation of . . . the legislative body in the office of making them.”  Id. 
 137. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have the Power, by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present 
concur”). 
 138. Van Alstine, supra note 136, at 1277–78. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 1276. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 1237. 
 143. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 26, at 22. 
 144. LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 70 (1990). 
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question may implicate the national interest in relation to other nations, if not 
national security, and that in foreign affairs the United States must “speak with 
a single voice” and that voice must be that of the experts, usually the executive 
branch.145 
Additionally, especially with treaties primarily involving foreign relations or 
national defense, the Executive Branch is actively involved in the daily 
implementation of the treaty.146  Therefore, “some level of executive branch 
interpretation is simply unavoidable.”147  However, the extent to which courts 
must defer to Executive Branch treaty interpretations remains unclear.148  This 
Part will propose that courts should not accord great deference to the 
President’s interpretation of the Vienna Convention. 
Proponents of judicial deference argue that the President is the popularly 
elected and constitutionally designated leader of foreign affairs, making his 
interpretation the most legitimate.149  However, Executive Branch treaty 
interpretations are not necessarily more legitimate than judicial interpretations, 
because unelected bureaucrats play a major or even predominant role in 
interpretation.150  “Today, none of the members of the Executive Branch, other 
than the President, is elected by the people, except in the most indirect and 
fictional sense.”151  The role played by unelected bureaucrats substantially 
undermines any legitimacy the President’s interpretation might otherwise gain 
by virtue of his elected status.152  By contrast, judges, though not popularly 
elected, enjoy practical legitimacy because they have more experience with 
statutory and legislative interpretation.153  As such, “judges are perhaps better 
qualified . . . to read what is relevant, including constitutional history and 
constitutional experience.”154 
Of course, it is true that judges encounter treaties on an infrequent basis, 
while Executive Branch officials are actively engaged in day-to-day treaty 
 
 145. Id. at 70–71. 
 146. Van Alstine, supra note 136, at 1298. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Jinks & Sloss, supra note 129, at 194. 
 149. HENKIN, supra note 144, at 78. 
 150. Id. The government’s brief as amicus curiae, submitted in Medellin, refers 
interchangeably to the Executive Branch’s interpretation of Article 36 and the State Department’s 
interpretation of Article 36, and aptly demonstrates the substantial role that unelected bureaucrats 
play in treaty interpretation.  See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 26, at 
22–24. 
 151. HENKIN, supra note 144, at 78. 
 152. See id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
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implementation.155  As such, many within the Executive Branch may have a 
wealth of real-life experience to supplement their interpretive powers and to 
enhance the legitimacy of Executive Branch treaty interpretations.  However, 
the careful balance created by the Constitution ensures that “one political 
branch (here, the Executive) cannot combine its authority to create legal rights 
and obligations with an unchecked power to interpret and apply them to 
specific citizens and disputes.”156  Therefore, Executive Branch officials may 
justifiably claim unique insight into the daily operation of the Vienna 
Convention.157  However, state courts should not accord great deference to an 
Executive Branch interpretation to avoid upsetting the careful balance created 
between the three branches of government.158 
Finally, in interpreting the Vienna Convention, courts owe at least 
“respectful consideration”159 to the ICJ’s interpretation.  By signing the 
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention, the United States ceded 
jurisdiction to the ICJ for disputes arising under the treaty.160  Additionally, the 
United States has actively endorsed the ICJ’s jurisdiction over disputes arising 
under the treaty by suing other nations in the ICJ for treaty violations.161  In 
 
 155. John C. Yoo, Treaty Interpretation and the False Sirens of Delegation, 90 CAL. L. REV. 
1305, 1310 (2002) (“The President must constantly interpret international law in the course of 
conducting our day-to-day foreign affairs.”). 
 156. Van Alstine, supra note 136, at 1277. 
 157. Yoo, supra note 155, at 1309. 
 158. See Van Alstine, supra note 136, at 1277. 
 159. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998). 
[W]hile we should give respectful consideration to the interpretation of an international 
treaty rendered by an international court with jurisdiction to interpret such, it has been 
recognized in international law that, absent a clear and express statement to the contrary, 
the procedural rules of the forum State govern the implementation of the treaty in that 
State. 
Id. 
 160. See Optional Protocol, supra note 42, at art. I.  As of March 2005, the United States is no 
longer a party to the Optional Protocol.  See Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 682 (2005) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Letter from Condoleeza Rice, Secretary of State, to Kofi A. 
Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations (Mar. 7, 2005)).  At the direction of President 
Bush, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice withdrew the United States from the Optional Protocol 
shortly after the President issued his memorandum directing the Attorney General to enforce the 
ICJ’s Avena decision.  See id.  However, at the time the ICJ rendered the Avena decision in 2004, 
the United States was still a party to the Optional Protocol and subject to the ICJ’s jurisdiction.  
Id. 
 161. See Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. 
Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 7 (May 24).  For a discussion of the United States’ interpretation of Article 
36(1) and (2) during the Iran Hostage Crisis, see John Quigley, The Law of State Responsibility 
and the Right to Consular Access, 11 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISPUTE RES. 39, 45–46 (2004); 
see also Emily Deck Harrill, Exorcising the Ghost: Finding a Right and a Remedy in Article 36 of 
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 55 S.C. L. REV. 569, 584–85 (2004) (noting that 
although the U.S. government maintains an official position today that Article 36(1) does not 
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doing so, the United States has sought to bind other nations under the 
jurisdiction of the ICJ to that tribunal’s interpretation.162  Surely, this nation is 
equally obligated to accord at least some weight to the ICJ’s interpretation of 
Article 36, which was rendered when the United States was still subject to the 
ICJ’s jurisdiction.163 
Justice O’Connor, dissenting in Medellin, touched on a second important 
justification for deference to the ICJ—the need to maintain one uniform 
interpretation of the treaty.164  A single interpretation of the treaty would 
promote uniform application of the treaty, which, in turn, would reinforce the 
legitimacy of the international system.165  The ICJ’s jurisdiction under the 
Optional Protocol gives its interpretation legitimacy in all signatory countries, 
and so adoption of the ICJ’s interpretation encourages uniform application of 
the treaty in all signatory countries.166 
The need for a single uniform interpretation of the treaty is evidenced by 
the conflicting interpretations that have resulted as lower courts have struggled 
to interpret the treaty for themselves.  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
refused to grant Medellin a writ of habeas corpus, finding, in direct 
contravention to Avena, that the Vienna Convention did not create individual 
rights.167  By contrast, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals deferred to the 
ICJ when it stayed the execution of Avena plaintiff Osvaldo Torres pending a 
hearing to determine whether the violation of his Article 36(1) rights had 
 
create an individual right to consular access, the government took the opposite position when 
U.S. officials wanted access to hostages confined in the American embassy in Tehran). 
 162. Quigley, supra note 161, at 45–46. 
 163. The ICJ’s interpretation of Article 36 was the cumulative result of several decisions, 
mainly the 2001 LaGrand case between Germany and the United States and the 2004 Avena case 
between Mexico and the United States.  See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican 
Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 43 I.L.M. 581 (I.C.J. Mar. 31, 2004); LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 
2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27).  The United States remained a party to the Optional Protocol and was 
subject to the ICJ’s jurisdiction until March 2005.  See Medellin, 544 U.S. at 682 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (citing Letter from Condoleeza Rice, Secretary of State, to Kofi A. Annan, Secretary-
General of the United Nations (Mar. 7, 2005)). 
 164. Medellin, 544 U.S. at 684 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  Discussing the questions 
presented, O’Connor noted, “[This case] asks whether and what weight American courts should 
give to Avena, perhaps for the sake of uniform treaty interpretation, even if they are not bound to 
follow the ICJ’s decision.”  Id. at 684 (emphasis added).  Notably, Justice O’Connor continued, 
“When called upon to interpret a treaty in a given case or controversy, we give considerable 
weight to the Executive Branch’s understanding of our treaty obligations. . . . But a treaty’s 
meaning is not beyond debate once the executive has interpreted it.”  Id. at 685–86 (citation 
omitted). 
 165. Id. at 684. 
 166. See Optional Protocol, supra note 42, at art. I. 
 167. Medellin, 544 U.S. at 663. 
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prejudiced his case.168  Judge Chapel, concurring in that case, “said that by 
virtue of the United States’ ratification of the Optional Protocol, his court was 
obligated to comport with the ICJ judgment in the Avena case.”169 
D. Author’s Analysis 
Courts cannot defer to both the President’s interpretation and the ICJ’s 
interpretation in ruling on appeals by the Avena plaintiffs.  As discussed, the 
President does not interpret Article 36(1) to confer a privately enforceable 
individual right, while the ICJ does interpret the treaty as conferring individual 
rights that can be enforced in U.S. courts.170  In the 2006 decision Sanchez-
Llamas v. Oregon, the Supreme Court reached this same impasse and chose to 
defer to the President’s interpretation.171  Although the Sanchez-Llamas Court 
did not ultimately decide whether Article 36 confers individual rights, the 
Court did conclude, in direct opposition to the ICJ, that state courts can apply 
rules of procedural default to block otherwise viable Article 36(1) claims.172  
Arguably, this decision does not extend to the Avena plaintiffs, because the 
Sanchez-Llamas Court again deferred to the President’s memorandum, 
apparently assuming (but not deciding) that it might still entitle those named in 
Avena to judicial review despite their procedural default.173  However, 
regardless of whether Sanchez-Llamas extends to appeals by the Avena 
plaintiffs, this author believes that it was wrongly decided, as will be discussed 
in Part IV. 
There are weighty reasons for deferring to both the President and the ICJ, 
and even the Supreme Court should not choose one over the other.  Instead, 
traditions of deference should be abandoned in interpreting Article 36.  Rather, 
the United States should adopt the ICJ’s interpretation, not out of deference to 
the ICJ, but because it best effectuates the purpose of Article 36.  Part III will 
demonstrate that a court should logically reach the ICJ’s interpretation when 
analyzing the treaty for the true meaning of its provisions.  Part IV will then 
discuss the shortcomings of Sanchez-Llamas and conclude that the Sanchez-
Llamas Court wrongly rejected the ICJ’s interpretation of Article 36. 
 
 168. John Quigley, Application of Consular Rights to Foreign Nationals: Standard for 
Reversal of a Criminal Conviction, 11 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 403, 411–12 (2005) (citing 
Order Granting Stay of Execution and Remanding Case for Evidentiary Hearing, Torres v. 
Oklahoma, No. PCD-04-442, slip. op. at 2 (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004)). 
 169. Id. at 412. 
 170. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 26, 
at 22–23. 
 171. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669, 2685 (2006). 
 172. Id. at 2687. 
 173. Id. at 2685. 
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III.  FROM LAGRAND TO AVENA: ENCOURAGING COURTS TO EMBRACE THE 
ACCURACY OF THE ICJ’S INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 36 
Having rejected two possible responses by state courts facing appeals from 
the Avena plaintiffs, this Comment suggests that the United States should 
adopt the ICJ’s interpretation of Article 36.  The Avena plaintiffs’ appeals 
should be reviewed by state courts, in accordance with that interpretation, 
because it best effectuates the purpose of Article 36.  The ICJ has had two 
major opportunities to delineate its interpretation and has considered both the 
creation of individual rights under Article 36(1) and the remedy for the 
violation of those rights under Article 36(2).174  This section will discuss each 
provision and the accuracy of the ICJ’s interpretation of each in turn. 
A. The LaGrand Case—Individual Rights Under Article 36 and the Problem 
with Procedural Default 
1. Article 36(1) and the Creation of Individual Rights 
The foundation of the ICJ’s interpretation lies in its reading of Article 
36(1).  The ICJ has consistently interpreted Article 36(1) to confer individual 
rights on foreign nationals, namely the rights to have their consulate notified of 
their detention and to receive consular aid and assistance.175  Article 36(1) of 
the Vienna Convention provides: 
With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to 
nationals of the sending State: 
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the 
sending State and to have access to them.  Nationals of the sending State 
shall have the same freedom with respect to communication with and 
access to consular officers of the sending State; 
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, 
without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its 
consular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison 
or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner.  Any 
communication addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in 
prison, custody or detention shall be forwarded by the said authorities 
without delay.  The said authorities shall inform the person concerned 
without delay of his rights under this subparagraph. 
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending State 
who is in prison, custody or detention, to converse and correspond with 
him and to arrange for his legal representation.  They shall also have the 
 
 174. See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 43 I.L.M. 581 
(I.C.J. Mar. 31, 2004); LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27). 
 175. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 494. 
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right to visit any national of the sending State who is in prison, custody, or 
detention in their district in pursuance of a judgment.  Nevertheless, 
consular officers shall refrain from taking action on behalf of a national 
who is in prison, custody, or detention if he expressly opposes such 
action.176 
The ICJ first considered whether Article 36(1) creates an individual right 
to consular assistance in the LaGrand case.177  In LaGrand, Germany sued the 
United States on behalf of itself and two German citizens, Walter and Karl 
LaGrand.178  The LaGrand brothers were convicted of murder in Arizona and 
sentenced to death without being notified of their right to contact the German 
consulate.179  The United States objected to Germany’s representation of the 
LaGrands as individuals, arguing that Article 36(1) only created rights in 
signatory nations.180  The United States conceded that Germany had a right to 
consular notification and could pursue a remedy for the United States’ failure 
to notify the German consulate that its citizens had been detained.181  However, 
the United States argued the LaGrands did not have an individual right to 
receive consular assistance, and thus had no standing to sue.182 
After careful examination of Article 36(1), the ICJ emphatically sided with 
Germany and concluded that Article 36(1) creates individual rights in 
citizens.183  The ICJ first noted that Article 36(1) specifically requires 
authorities to “inform the person concerned . . . of his rights under this 
subparagraph.”184  The court concluded that the phrase “his rights” created an 
individual right to seek consular assistance, apart from a nation’s right to 
render such assistance.185  The ICJ also found that a nation cannot provide 
assistance to an individual “if he expressly opposes such action.”186  That a 
detained foreign national could prevent his nation from intervening on his 
behalf reinforced the ICJ’s conclusion that citizens have individual rights 
under Article 36(1).187 
Opponents of the ICJ’s interpretation of Article 36(1) have argued that 
“Article 36 . . . is an awkward place to enumerate the rights of an individual 
 
 176. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 3, at art. 36(1). 
 177. 2001 I.C.J. 466. 
 178. Id at 470–72. 
 179. Id. at 475. 
 180. Id. at 493. 
 181. Id. 
 182. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 493. 
 183. Id. at 494 (“The clarity of these provisions, viewed in their context, admits of no 
doubt.”). 
 184. Id. (quoting Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 3, art. 36(1)) 
(emphasis added). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 494. 
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national,”188 as the main objective of the Vienna Convention was to establish a 
system of consular relations among nations.189  Specifically, critics point to the 
preamble language, stating that “the purpose of [consular] privileges and 
immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance 
of functions by consular posts on behalf of their respective states.”190  
However, when read in context, the preamble does not contradict the ICJ’s 
interpretation.191  Because most of the Vienna Convention is devoted to the 
rights and benefits of consular officials, the preamble is directed toward that 
general purpose.192 
However, the mere fact that the general purpose of a treaty is to create 
rights and privileges between nations does not prevent specific provisions 
within the treaty from creating individual rights.  In 1796, the Supreme Court 
found that the Treaty of 1783, though generally enacted to establish peaceful 
relations between Great Britain and the United States after the Revolutionary 
War, also created individual rights in citizens.193  The plaintiff in Ware v. 
Hylton, a British subject, sued several Virginia citizens to recover debts 
incurred prior to the American Revolution.194  Immediately after the war, 
Virginia had enacted a law that allowed Virginians owing debts to British 
subjects to pay the amount owed to the Commonwealth of Virginia and be 
discharged from the debt.195  The defendants in Ware alleged that their debts 
were settled pursuant to this law.196 
Ware argued that the Treaty of 1783, signed by the United States and Great 
Britain, nullified Virginia’s law and reinstated the debts owed to him.197  A key 
provision of the treaty stated, “It is agreed that creditors, on either side, shall 
meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery in the full value of sterling 
money, of all bona fide debts, heretofore contracted.”198  The Court recognized 
that the general purpose of the treaty was to establish peace between Great 
 
 188. Mark J. Kadish, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Search 
for the Right to Consul, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 565, 593 (1997). 
 189. Id.  Kadish notes that, if taken out of context, the preamble language and the avowed 
purpose of the Vienna Convention as stated in the preamble seem to support the U.S. 
government’s current interpretation of the treaty.  Id. at 593–94. 
 190. See Quigley, supra note 161, at 44 (emphasis added). 
 191. See id. at 45. 
 192. See id.  Read in context, the preamble conveys the idea that “the privileges and 
immunities granted in the Vienna Convention are to enable the consul to perform his enumerated 
functions, not to benefit the consul personally.”  Kadish, supra note 188, at 594. 
 193. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 245 (1796). 
 194. See id. at 199. 
 195. Id. at 199–200. 
 196. See id. at 200. 
 197. See id. at 210. 
 198. Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 239 (quoting Treaty of 1783, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. 4, Sept. 3, 
1783). 
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Britain and the United States.199  However, the Ware Court also found that the 
treaty created an unambiguous individual right to recover debts lawfully 
incurred prior to the war.200  Accordingly, the Court found for Ware and 
concluded that the Virginia law unlawfully impeded his ability to recover the 
debts.201 
a. Author’s Analysis 
The Supreme Court’s logic in Ware v. Hylton is equally applicable to the 
preamble language of the Vienna Convention.  Unquestionably, the general 
purpose of the Convention is to establish a system of consular relations among 
nations.202  However, as in Ware, this does not negate the possibility that the 
specific purpose of Article 36(1) is to establish the rights of an individual 
citizen detained in a foreign nation. 
Additionally, the ICJ’s reading of Article 36(1) furthers the purpose of that 
provision.203  A basic tenet of treaty interpretation is that the provisions of a 
treaty are to be read “in their context and in the light of [the treaty’s] object 
and purpose.”204  One purpose for providing consular assistance is to aid an 
individual under prosecution in a foreign country; consular officials can help 
detainees find good lawyers and collect evidence and can help detainees 
understand the foreign legal system.205  The ICJ’s interpretation of Article 
36(1) recognizes and effectuates this purpose.206 
 
 199. See id. at 238.  A principle object of the treaty, in the eyes of the United States, was to 
establish the independence of the new government from the Crown.  See id.  The treaty provided 
for “[a]n acknowledgement of their independence, by the crown of Great Britain,” as well as “[a] 
settlement of their western bounds. . . . [t]he right of fishery. . . . [and] [t]he free navigation of the 
Mississippi.”  Id. 
 200. See id. at 245.  Specifically, the Court’s decision noted: 
I cannot conceive that the wisdom of men could express their meaning in more accurate 
and intelligible words . . . the words, in their natural import, and common use, give a 
recovery to the British creditor from his original debtor of the debt contracted before the 
treaty, notwithstanding the payment thereof into the public treasuries, or loan offices, 
under the authority of any State law. 
Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 3, at pmbl. 
 203. See Quigley, supra note 161, at 43–44. 
 204. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 
8 I.L.M. 679 (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”); 
see also Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 239 (“The intention of the framers of the treaty, must be 
collected from a view of the whole instrument, and from the words made use of by them to 
express their intention, or from probable or rational conjectures.”). 
 205. See Adrienne M. Tranel, Comment, The Ruling of the International Court of Justice in 
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals: Enforcing the Right to Consular Assistance in U.S. 
Jurisprudence, 20 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 403, 411 (2005) (detailing the wide array of services 
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2. Article 36(2) and the Doctrine of Procedural Default 
In the context of finding a remedy for Article 36(1) violations by the 
United States, the ICJ has grappled with this nation’s doctrine of procedural 
default.207  Procedural default, whereby “a defendant who . . . fails to raise a 
legal issue at trial will generally not be permitted to raise it in future 
proceedings,”208 has often prevented foreign nationals from asserting otherwise 
valid Article 36(1) claims on appeal.209 
In the United States, procedural default rules exist at both the state and 
federal levels.  At the state level, a criminal defendant sentenced to death may 
appeal his sentence directly on the grounds that the judge misapplied the 
law;210 theoretically, he may appeal all the way to the Supreme Court of the 
United States on these grounds.211  However, on direct review, a defendant 
procedurally defaults if he fails to raise an issue at his original criminal trial—
state appellate courts and the Supreme Court hearing a case on direct review 
cannot generally adjudicate an issue on appeal that was not raised at trial.212 
Criminal defendants may also file petitions for habeas corpus review.  
Habeas corpus review, which exists at both state and federal levels, is also 
known as collateral review because it allows a litigant to assert a civil claim 
challenging the legality of his confinement as a violation of his rights under the 
Constitution.213 
A petition for state habeas relief allows a litigant to bring a civil claim 
against the State, challenging his confinement by the state as illegal.214  
However, as with direct appeals, state laws often prevent litigants from raising 
 
that consular officials can provide to detained foreign nationals, upon proper notification); see 
also Brief of Applicant, supra note 5, at 8 (detailing the services routinely rendered by the 
Mexican consulate to assist Mexican citizens detained abroad). 
 206. See John Quigley, supra note 161, at 43–44. 
 207. See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 43 I.L.M. 
581, 613 (I.C.J. Mar. 31, 2004); LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 495 (June 27). 
 208. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 613. 
 209. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 497. 
 210. For example, see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.02 (1979). 
 211. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 393–94 (1821) (establishing the 
Supreme Court’s power to review state court criminal convictions). 
 212. For example, in Texas, if a litigant wishes to appeal his conviction on the grounds that 
the trial court allowed inadmissible evidence, under the contemporaneous objection rule, the 
litigant will first have to show that he made a timely objection to the admission of the evidence at 
trial.  See Satillan v. State, 470 S.W.2d 677, 678 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971). 
 213. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 15.1, 838 (3d. ed. 1999). 
 214. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.01 (2005) (“The writ of habeas corpus is the 
remedy to be used when any person is restrained in his liberty.”); id. art. 11.14 (“The petition 
must state substantially: 1. that the person for whose benefit the application is made is illegally 
restrained in his liberty”). 
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an issue in a habeas petition that the litigant failed to raise at trial.215  
Additionally, some states limit a litigant’s ability to file successive petitions for 
habeas relief raising an issue not raised in the original petition.216 
At the federal level, a federal court may issue a writ of habeas corpus and 
review a state criminal conviction where “a person . . . claims to be held in 
custody by a state government in violation of the Constitution, treaties, or laws 
of the United States.”217  If the court finds in the prisoner’s favor, “the federal 
court may order the release of a state prisoner who is held by the state in 
violation of federal law.”218  Federal habeas corpus review has its own 
procedural default rules—a litigant must show that he has exhausted his state 
remedies and that the issue he raises in his federal habeas petition was fully 
presented in state court.219  Additionally, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act (AEDPA) severely restricts the power of federal courts to issue 
successive writs.220  For those Avena plaintiffs who have exhausted their state 
 
 215. In Medellin’s case, the Texas trial court rejected his petition for state habeas relief, 
although “[t]he state did not contest that . . . state officials had failed to advise Mr. Medellin of 
his right under Article 36.”  Brief of Applicant, supra note 5, at 10.  The trial court denied relief, 
finding that Medellin was procedurally barred from raising his Article 36(1) claim on appeal, 
having failed to object at his trial.  Id. 
 216. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071 § 5(a)(1) (2005).  For example, the state of 
Texas prevents a litigant from raising a new issue in a successive petition unless the litigant can 
show that “the current claims and issues have not been and could not have been presented 
previously . . . because the factual basis for the claim was unavailable on the date the applicant 
filed the previous application.”  Id.  These restrictions could negate the effect of the ICJ’s Avena 
decision if enforced.  To illustrate, a foreign national in Texas, who exhausts his remedies under 
direct review and files an initial state habeas petition without learning of his right to consular 
assistance may be prevented from bringing a second petition when he does learn of the violation, 
unless the Texas court determines the “the factual basis for the claim was not available” at the 
time he filed his original petition.  Id. 
  Since Avena, at least one state court has agreed to review a third successive habeas 
petition on this ground.  See Torres v. State, 120 P.3d 1184 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005); Quigley, 
supra note 168, at 411–12.  Although it had previously denied two successive habeas petitions, 
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals directed a trial court to review a third habeas petition by 
Osvaldo Torres, another Avena plaintiff, in light of the ICJ’s ruling in Avena.  Id.  Before a 
decision could be rendered by the lower court on remand, Torres’s death sentence was commuted 
to a life sentence without possibility of parole by Oklahoma Governor Brad Henry.  Torres, 120 
P.3d at 1186. 
 217. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 213, at § 15.1, 838. 
 218. Id.  Federal habeas is a very complex area of law.  Put simply, a litigant seeking a federal 
writ of habeas corpus must demonstrate that he is “‘in custody,’ all available state remedies have 
been exhausted, and the petition [does] not duplicate an earlier petition that was presented and 
rejected.”  Id. at 855. 
 219. Id. at 859, 863.  As to the second requirement, a litigant seeking federal habeas relief 
may not raise an issue that was not litigated in state court unless he can show “either actual 
innocence or good ‘cause’ for the procedural default and ‘prejudice.’”  Id. at 881. 
 220. Id. at 870.  Under AEDPA, a federal court can grant a successive petition for federal 
habeas corpus in only two circumstances.  Id. at 870–871. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2007] “IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF COMITY” 843 
remedies, the combined effect of the federal procedural default rules and 
AEDPA could be to deny them any forum within which to litigate the denial of 
their Article 36 rights.221 
The ICJ first confronted the application of procedural default to Article 
36(1) claims in the LaGrand case.222  Germany argued that procedural default 
had prevented the LaGrands from redressing the violation of their rights.223  
Germany argued that procedural default, as applied to the LaGrands, violated 
Article 36(2),224 which provides: 
[T]he rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be exercised in 
conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving state, subject to the 
proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to 
be given to the purpose for which the rights accorded under this article are 
intended.225 
The United States disputed Germany’s interpretation of Article 36(2), 
arguing that the phrase “said laws and regulations” was not meant to 
encompass criminal procedure laws in a signatory state’s judicial system.226  
Instead, the United States argued it referred to “[laws] that may affect the 
 
First, a successive petition may be allowed if, “the applicant shows that the claim relies on 
a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the 
Supreme Court that was previously unavailable.”  Alternatively, the petition may be 
permitted if “the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously 
through the exercise of due diligence and the facts underlying the claim, if proven and 
viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that, but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would 
have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.” 
Id. at 871 (quoting Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 656, 657 (1996)). 
 221. This can be illustrated by applying the rules to the case of a hypothetical foreign 
national.  If a foreign national is arrested and convicted in violation of Article 36(1), without ever 
being notified of his right to contact the consulate, he will not raise the issue of the denial of his 
Article 36(1) rights at his original criminal trial.  (Indeed, he cannot assert the claim at his 
original criminal trial, because if he has never been notified of his rights, he has no way of 
knowing he even has such rights, much less that they have been violated.)  If he then goes on to 
exhaust his state remedies, direct appeal, and state habeas corpus without learning of his Article 
36(1) rights, he never has the chance to litigate the issue in a state court proceeding.  Upon 
applying for a federal writ of habeas corpus, he may only raise the issue of his Article 36(1) rights 
if he can show either actual innocence or both cause and prejudice.  Further, assuming he does not 
learn of his right to consular assistance until after his original petition for federal habeas relief is 
denied, AEDPA will restrict his right to file a successive petition asserting the denial of his 
Article 36(1) rights. 
 222. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 495 (June 27). 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 3, at art. 36(2) (emphasis added). 
 226. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 496. 
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exercise of specific rights under Article 36(1), such as . . . timing of 
communications, visiting hours and security in a detention facility.”227 
Once again, the ICJ sided with Germany.228  The ICJ found that procedural 
default rules had prevented the LaGrands from receiving meaningful review of 
their Article 36(1) violation and thereby violated Article 36(2).229  By the time 
German consular officials learned of the LaGrands’ predicament, the brothers’ 
trial and sentencing had already occurred without the brothers ever being 
notified of their Article 36(1) rights.230  Because they were never informed of 
those rights, the issue was not raised at their criminal trial; yet they were 
prevented by procedural default from asserting the issue later in a habeas 
petition.231  The ICJ concluded that procedural default rules prevented U.S. 
courts from “attaching any legal significance” to the violation of the LaGrand 
brothers’ Article 36(1) rights because the issue was never reviewed by any 
United States court.232  The ICJ further concluded that the only way for the 
United States to meet its Article 36(2) obligations was to provide some review 
of the convictions and sentences of individuals convicted in violation of their 
Article 36(1) rights.233 
a. Author’s Analysis 
Here, as above, there is ample reason to embrace the ICJ’s interpretation 
and limit the application of state procedural default rules where they would 
prevent a litigant from asserting an otherwise valid Article 36(1) claim.234  
First of all, as a matter of treaty interpretation, treaty provisions are to be read 
in light of their context and the underlying purposes of the treaty itself.235  At 
least one purpose of Article 36 is clearly to protect a foreign national detained 
 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 497–98. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 497–98. 
 232. Id. at 497. 
 233. Id. at 513–14 (“[I]f the United States . . . should fail in its obligation of consular 
notification to the detriment of German nationals, an apology would not suffice in cases where 
the individuals concerned have been subjected to prolonged detention or convicted and sentenced 
to severe penalties. . . . [I]t would be incumbent upon the United States to allow for the review 
and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking account of the violation of the rights 
set forth in the Convention.”). 
 234. Although this Part includes an explanation of federal habeas corpus, this is only intended 
to provide the reader with the background information necessary to understand the doctrine of 
procedural default.  The author does not propose that federal courts abandon the complex rules of 
procedural default that govern petitions for federal habeas relief.  This argument is strictly limited 
in scope to those procedural default rules applicable to appeals for direct review at the state level 
and to petitions for state habeas relief. 
 235. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 204, at art. 31(1). 
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and prosecuted in an unfamiliar legal system.  When procedural default rules 
prevent a litigant from ever asserting the denial of his Article 36(1) rights in 
some forum, the purpose behind those provisions goes unfulfilled. 
Likewise, a fundamental tenet of this country’s jurisprudence is that a 
litigant with a legal right must have some means to enforce that right.236  If the 
Avena court is correct in finding that Article 36(1) confers an individual right 
to consular assistance (as this author believes it is), procedural default can, in 
some circumstances, rob a foreign national of any opportunity to ever vindicate 
that right.237  In those cases, the application of procedural default stands 
squarely in opposition to 250 years of U.S. jurisprudence. 
B. The Avena Case—Defining the Scope of Individual Rights Under Article 
36(1) and Finding an Appropriate Remedy Under 36(2) 
1. The Meaning of “Without Delay” 
In 2004, the ICJ revisited the issue of the proper interpretation of Article 
36(1) in the Avena case.238  One major issue in Avena was the proper definition 
of the phrase “without delay” in Article 36(1)(b).239  Article 36(1)(b) makes it 
the duty of the arresting nation’s authorities to “inform [the foreign 
national] . . . without delay of his rights under this subparagraph.”240  Mexico 
lobbied for a definition of “without delay” that would require notification 
“‘immediately,’ and in any event before any interrogation occurs.”241  The ICJ 
rejected Mexico’s strict interpretation and read Article 36(1)(b) to require 
notification to a foreign national “once it is realized that the person is a foreign 
national, or once there are grounds to think that the person is probably a 
foreign national.”242 
a. Author’s Analysis 
The ICJ’s conclusion on this point is well-taken.  Providing notification at 
an early stage in the proceedings may prevent a litigant adrift in a foreign legal 
 
 236. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803) (“It is a settled and invariable 
principle, that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper 
redress.”). 
 237. For instance, see the hypothetical example supra note 221. 
 238. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 43 I.L.M. 581 
(I.C.J. Mar. 31, 2004). 
 239. Id. at 596. 
 240. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 3, at art. 36(1)(b) (emphasis 
added). 
 241. Avena, 43 I.L.M. at 604. 
 242. Id. 
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system from making serious, or even potentially fatal, errors in judgment.243  
The case of Angel Francisco Breard is illustrative.  Breard, a Paraguayan 
citizen, was arrested for rape and murder and convicted in Virginia in violation 
of his Article 36(1) rights.244  Without consular assistance to explain to Breard 
the consequences of his actions in the American legal system, he chose to 
confess to the jury, although he pleaded not guilty.245  “Breard’s decision 
exemplified his misperception of the U.S. legal system; he believed that if he 
confessed his crime and explained his new ‘conversion and rebirth in Jesus 
Christ,’ the jury would forgive him as had Christ.”246  Instead, his confession 
sealed his fate, and the jury sentenced Breard to death.247  Early consular 
notification and assistance by the Paraguayan consulate in Breard’s defense 
might have saved his life. 
2. The Shortcomings of Clemency 
The ICJ in Avena also revisited the proper remedy, under Article 36(2), for 
a violation of an individual’s Article 36(1) rights.248  Despite repeated requests 
by Germany in LaGrand, the ICJ in that case had refused to define a preferred 
method of review the United States should follow in redressing future Article 
36(1) violations.249  However, the ICJ in Avena reiterated its earlier objection 
to procedural default and rejected the clemency process as a means for 
providing meaningful review.250 
In Avena, Mexico attacked the United States’ system of reviewing Article 
36(1) violations, which, despite the LaGrand holding, consisted of continued 
adherence to procedural default and reliance on the clemency process to 
provide a forum where a litigant procedurally defaulted.251  Mexico argued that 
the LaGrand court had implicitly found clemency was an inadequate method 
 
 243. See Kadish, supra note 188, at 582 (detailing the legal ramifications and the eventually 
fatal consequences of delayed consular notification in the case of Angel Francisco Breard of 
Paraguay).  For another discussion of Breard’s case and his ill-advised confession, see Harrill, 
supra note 161, at 583. 
 244. See Kadish, supra note 188, at 582. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at n.110. 
 248. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 43 I.L.M. 581, 
614 (I.C.J. Mar. 31, 2004). 
 249. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 514 (June 27).  While noting that the 
United States’ obligations under the treaty would require some kind of review and 
reconsideration of future convictions obtained in violation of Article 36, the LaGrand court 
concluded, “This obligation can be carried out in various ways.  The choice of means must be left 
to the United States.”  Id. 
 250. Avena, 43 I.L.M. at 619–20; Tranel, supra note 205, at 445–46 (“Clemency generally 
refers to the executive power to commute or pardon a sentence or conviction.”). 
 251. Avena, 43 I.L.M. at 618. 
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of review.252  Mexico pointed out that the ICJ in that case had found the United 
States to be in violation of Article 36(2), although the LaGrand brothers’ 
sentences had already been reviewed by the Arizona Pardons Board.253  Thus, 
Mexico argued, LaGrand indicated that clemency review does not fully 
effectuate an individual’s Article 36(1) rights, as required by Article 36(2).254  
Mexico also argued that the clemency process gives no consideration to 
innocence on the underlying conviction, as required by the court in LaGrand; 
rather, “the focus of capital clemency review is on the propriety of the 
sentence.”255 
The ICJ in Avena agreed with Mexico that clemency had proved 
ineffective as a means of reviewing Article 36(1) violations.256  Although it 
recognized the LaGrand court’s decision to leave the method of review up to 
the United States, the Avena court concluded that Article 36(1) violations 
should be considered in a judicial forum.257 
a. Author’s Analysis 
Here, as above, sound rationale supports the ICJ’s determination.  
Professor Linda Carter has argued that clemency is an inadequate means of 
redressing Article 36 violations because the process lacks judicial oversight, 
and thus is inconsistently applied, and also because clemency is rarely 
granted.258  Clemency is generally considered an executive power and so 
“[t]here is virtually no judicial oversight of the Executive’s grant or denial of 
clemency.”259  As such, clemency is not subject to concrete standards of 
review and is applied inconsistently from state to state.260  As Professor Carter 
points out, Governor George Ryan granted clemency to all 167 prisoners on 
death row in Illinois in 2003.261  By contrast, California has not granted 
 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Avena, 43 I.L.M at 619–20. 
 257. Id. at 619. 
The Court in the LaGrand case left to the United States the choice of means as to how 
review and reconsideration should be achieved, especially in light of the procedural 
default rule.  Nevertheless, the premise on which the Court proceeded in that case was 
that the process of review and reconsideration should occur within the overall judicial 
proceedings relating to the individual defendant concerned. 
Id. 
 258. Linda E. Carter, Lessons From Avena: The Inadequacy of Clemency and Judicial 
Proceedings for Violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 15 DUKE J. COMP. 
& INT’L L. 259, 266–69 (2005). 
 259. Id. at 266. 
 260. Id. at 267. 
 261. Id. at 268. 
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clemency to a single death row inmate since the death penalty was reinstated in 
1976, and yet it has the largest death row population.262 
Additionally, clemency is granted so rarely that it simply is not a reliable 
means of reviewing Article 36(1) violations.263  Since 1976, only 228 inmates, 
including the 167 inmates in Illinois in 2003, have been granted clemency.264  
Conversely, “960 executions have taken place, and . . . over 3,400 [people are] 
on death row in the United States.”265 
IV.  SANCHEZ-LLAMAS V. OREGON: THE DOCTRINE OF PROCEDURAL DEFAULT 
IN THE WAKE OF AVENA 
The correct interpretation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention remains 
a highly relevant issue today.  In June 2006, the Supreme Court handed down 
its decision in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, a consolidated case that considered 
the Article 36(1) claims of two other foreign nationals, Moises Sanchez-
Llamas of Mexico,266 and Mario Bustillo of Honduras.267  In Medellin, the 
 
 262. Id. 
 263. See Carter, supra note 258, at 269–70.  The Avena case aptly demonstrates the 
exceedingly rare nature of clemency (and consequently, the danger of relying on clemency as a 
remedy for redressing Article 36 violations).  While reviewing the plaintiffs’ cases, the ICJ in 
Avena noted that although “in at least [thirty-three] cases, the alleged breach of the Vienna 
Convention was raised by the defendant either during pre-trial, at trial, or on appeal or in habeas 
corpus proceedings . . . . To date, in none of the [fifty-two] cases have the defendants had 
recourse to the clemency process.”  Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. 
v. U.S.), 43 I.L.M. 581, 594 (I.C.J. Mar. 31, 2004). 
 264. Carter, supra note 258, at 268–69. 
 265. Id. at 269. 
 266. In 1999, Moises Sanchez-Llamas, a Mexican citizen, was arrested after a gun battle with 
police that left one officer injured.  State v. Sanchez-Llamas, 108 P.3d 573, 574 (Or. 2005).  After 
his arrest, officers read him his Miranda rights in both English and Spanish, but did not inform 
him of his Article 36(1) rights.  Id.  He was later interrogated and made incriminating statements 
to police.  Id.  As a result, Sanchez-Llamas was charged with attempted murder and various other 
crimes.  Id.  At trial, he moved to suppress the statements made during his interrogation on the 
ground that they had been obtained in violation of his Article 36(1) rights.  Id.  The trial court 
found that suppression was not required, even assuming Sanchez-Llamas’ rights had been 
violated.  Id.  Ultimately, Sanchez-Llamas was convicted of multiple felonies and sentenced to 
over twenty years in prison.  Id.  The Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed, concluding that Article 
36(1) does not create privately enforceable rights for individual foreign nationals.  Id. at 578. 
 267. Mario Bustillo, a Honduran national, was charged and convicted of murdering a man 
with a baseball bat outside a restaurant in Springfield, Virginia.  See Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari at 2, Bustillo v. Johnson, 126 S. Ct. 2315 (2006) (No. 05-51).  Although three 
eyewitnesses identified Bustillo as the killer, two other eyewitnesses named another Honduran 
national, Julio Orsoto, who could not be located during Bustillo’s criminal trial.  Id.  On appeal, 
Bustillo alleged that the Commonwealth of Virginia had failed to inform him of his rights under 
Article 36(1) of the Vienna Convention.  Id. at 3.  Additionally, he submitted an affidavit from 
the Honduran consulate, stating that if it had learned of his case in time, “it would have (at a 
minimum) confirmed Julio Orsoto’s . . . nationality, provided official records of his arrival in 
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Supreme Court had dismissed the writ partly because the case came to the 
Court on federal habeas review, so that various procedural hurdles would have 
prevented the Court from giving a definitive answer.268  However, the Medellin 
Court indicated that it would finally decide whether state courts are bound by 
the ICJ’s interpretation of Article 36 if the issue came up on direct review.269  
In Sanchez-Llamas, which came on direct review, the Court considered 1) 
whether Article 36(1) of the Vienna Convention creates individually 
enforceable rights to consular access and assistance, 2) whether a state court 
may refuse to review an Article 36(1) claim because the defendant 
procedurally defaulted, and 3) whether suppression of evidence is an 
appropriate remedy for an Article 36(1) violation.270 
Ultimately, the Sanchez-Llamas Court concluded that neither petitioner 
was entitled to the relief he sought, and refused to reach the issue of whether 
 
Honduras shortly after [the victim’s death], attempted to interview [Orsoto], and provided the 
defense with [Orsoto’s] picture.”  Id. at 9.  Despite this affidavit and the fact that the United 
States conceded that it had violated Bustillo’s rights and issued a formal apology to Honduras, 
Virginia state courts refused to review his conviction, finding that Bustillo had procedurally 
defaulted by failing to raise the issue at trial.  Id. 
 268. See Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 666 (2005) (discussing the difficulties that 
Medellin would face in getting a certificate of appealability, and in proving that he had exhausted 
his state court remedies, both of which would be required for him to “pursue the merits of his 
claim on appeal”). 
  The Medellin Court also found it likely that the state of Texas would grant Medellin 
further review, in light of the President’s memorandum.  Id. at 666.  After his writ was dismissed 
by the Supreme Court, Medellin filed a successive petition for state habeas relief, citing the Avena 
decision and the President’s memorandum in Medellin as preemptive federal law that provided 
previously unavailable factual and legal bases for habeas relief in his case.  See Ex Parte 
Medellin, No. AP-75207, 2006 WL 3302639, at *2–3 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 15, 2006).  In 
November 2006, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals issued a decision dismissing Medellin’s 
successive habeas petition.  See id. at *24.  The court found that the President lacked the power to 
require state courts to comply with the Avena decision and rejected this argument as a basis for 
habeas relief in Medellin’s case.  Id. at *10.  The court further concluded that the ICJ’s 
interpretation of the treaty in Avena did not constitute binding federal law that could preempt 
Texas procedural default laws.  Id. at *9.  In so holding, the Texas court relied on the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669 (2006), where the Supreme Court 
rejected the ICJ’s interpretation of Article 36 as inconsistent with the American legal system.  Id. 
 269. See Medellin, 544 U.S. at 666.  The majority cited “the possibility that the Texas courts 
will provide Medellin with the review he seeks . . . [and] the potential for review in this Court 
once the Texas courts have heard and decided Medellin’s pending action.”  Id. (emphasis added).  
Justice Ginsburg in her concurrence also felt that deciding the issue as presented by a habeas 
petitioner was too difficult procedurally.  See id. at 668–69.  However, Justice Ginsburg joined 
the decision to dismiss the writ, “recognizing that this Court would have jurisdiction to review the 
final judgment in the Texas proceedings, and at that time, to rule definitively on ‘the Nation’s 
obligation under the judgment of the ICJ if that should prove necessary.’”  Id. at 669 (Ginsburg, 
J., concurring) (quoting Souter, J., dissenting.). 
 270. See Questions Presented, Bustillo v. Johnson, No. 05-51 (U.S. Nov. 7, 2005), available 
at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/05-00051qp.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2007). 
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Article 36(1) creates individual rights.271  In the case of Moises Sanchez-
Llamas, the Court found that, even assuming the treaty creates individual 
rights, suppression is not a proper remedy for a violation of those rights.272  
More pertinent to this Comment, the Court also held that the state of Virginia 
could refuse to review Mario Bustillo’s conviction because he had 
procedurally defaulted by failing to raise the violation of his Article 36(1) 
rights at his criminal trial.273 
In deciding that Virginia could apply procedural default to Bustillo’s 
Article 36(1) claim, the Sanchez-Llamas Court first held that U.S. courts are 
not bound by the ICJ’s decision that Article 36 precludes the application of 
procedural default.274  First, the Court noted that under the Constitution, U.S. 
courts have the ultimate authority to interpret treaties.275  Second, the Court 
found that under the Optional Protocol, an ICJ decision only binds the two 
parties involved and only in that particular case—ICJ decisions do not create 
binding precedent.276  Third, the Court noted that the Executive Branch, the 
political branch actually responsible for implementing the Vienna Convention, 
has not taken the position that the ICJ’s interpretation of the treaty binds U.S. 
courts.277  Finally, the Court found that President Bush withdrew from the 
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention shortly after Avena was 
decided.278  As the United States is no longer under the ICJ’s jurisdiction, the 
Court concluded that the ICJ is merely another international court, and its 
interpretation is entitled to nothing more than “respectful consideration.”279 
After concluding that U.S. courts are not bound to follow the ICJ’s 
interpretation, the Court expressly rejected that interpretation as “inconsistent 
with the basic framework of an adversary system.”280  The Court found that the 
ICJ’s rejection of procedural default conflicted with the express language of 
Article 36(2) that the treaty “shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and 
regulations of the receiving State.”281  The Court pointed out that many other 
viable claims besides Article 36(1) claims are regularly denied a forum to 
promote the twin goals of procedural default—the prompt litigation of claims 
and the finality of judgments in the American legal system.282  Finally, the 
 
 271. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2681. 
 272. Id. at 2682. 
 273. See id. at 2687. 
 274. Id. at 2684–85. 
 275. See id. at 2684. 
 276. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2684. 
 277. Id. at 2685. 
 278. Id. 
 279. See id. 
 280. Id. at 2686. 
 281. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2685. 
 282. See id. at 2685–86. 
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Court found that, in the United States, which has an adversarial legal system 
where the parties, and not the judge, are responsible for conducting a factual 
and legal investigation, “the responsibility for failing to raise an issue generally 
rests with the parties themselves.”283 
Justice Breyer wrote a spirited dissent that decried the Court’s lack of 
deference to the ICJ’s interpretation of the treaty.284  He argued that state 
procedural default rules should yield for Article 36(1) claims, at least where 
the failure to raise the issue at trial is due to the government’s failure to inform 
a foreign national of his rights and no other means is provided by the state to 
redress the violation.285 
CONCLUSION 
This author believes that Sanchez-Llamas was wrongly decided and that 
the Court should have adopted the ICJ’s interpretation and read the treaty to 
preclude the application of procedural default, at least in some instances.  
Specifically, this Comment proposes that Article 36(1) claims should be heard 
despite procedural default rules in any instance where the violation prejudiced 
the individual’s case. 
The Sanchez-Llamas decision is problematic because it seems to promote 
different applications of the same law to litigants in similar situations.  To 
illustrate, the Sanchez-Llamas holding likely did not encompass the Avena 
plaintiffs.  As in Medellin, the Sanchez-Llamas Court cited the President’s 
memorandum and appeared to presume that the Avena plaintiffs are entitled to 
have their convictions reviewed despite otherwise applicable procedural 
default rules.286  A few paragraphs later, however, the majority concluded that 
Mario Bustillo was not entitled to such review.287  Yet Mario Bustillo is in the 
same situation as many Avena plaintiffs, including Medellin—like Medellin, 
authorities failed to notify Bustillo of his Article 36(1) rights and he was 
convicted without ever learning of those rights.288  Each defendant’s criminal 
 
 283. Id. at 2686. 
 284. See id. at 2702 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision interprets an international 
treaty in a manner that conflicts not only with the treaty’s language and history, but also with the 
ICJ’s interpretation of the same treaty provision.  In creating this last-mentioned conflict . . . the 
Court’s decision is unprecedented.”). 
 285. See id. at 2702–03 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 286. See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2685 (majority opinion) (citing President Bush’s 
memorandum and noting that “the United States has agreed to ‘discharge its international 
obligations’ in having state courts give effect to the decision in Avena”). 
 287. See id. at 2687. 
 288. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 267, at 3; Brief of Applicant supra note 
5, at 8. 
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case was prejudiced by the violation of his Article 36(1) rights.289  Both 
defendants failed to raise the issue at their criminal trials because neither had 
been informed of his rights; therefore, each man procedurally defaulted.290  Yet 
under Sanchez-Llamas, Medellin may be entitled to have his Article 36(1) 
claim reviewed despite his procedural default, while Bustillo is not.291 
By contrast, the solution proposed by this Comment results in a uniform 
outcome for both litigants.  Under the ICJ’s interpretation, procedural default is 
inappropriate in any case where it would prevent a litigant whose case was 
prejudiced by the denial of his Article 36(1) rights from asserting that violation 
in some judicial forum.292  Under this interpretation, both Medellin and 
Bustillo are entitled to have their Article 36(1) claims reviewed, because 
review is necessary to give those rights “full effect” within the meaning of 
Article 36(2).  The ICJ’s interpretation thus ensures that egregious Article 
36(1) violations are not ignored, as often results from application of procedural 
default rules and reliance on the clemency process.293  As the Sanchez-Llamas 
Court pointed out, the treaty is to be implemented in accordance with the laws 
of each signatory country—but only so far as those laws allow the provisions 
of the treaty to have their intended effect.294  Where procedural default rules 
prevent a litigant like Bustillo from ever asserting his rights in any judicial 
forum, they do prevent Article 36(1) from having its intended effect. 
Additionally, following the ICJ’s interpretation of the treaty could have 
positive long-term consequences for the United States’ interests abroad.  
“[T]he policy [of ignoring Article 36(1) violations] is counter-productive, since 
the United States has thousands of its nationals abroad at any given time and 
thus has more to gain from strict enforcement of consular access rights than do 
most other States of the world.”295  Adopting the ICJ’s interpretation and 
refusing to apply procedural default rules where they prevent a prejudiced 
litigant from ever asserting an Article 36(1) violation would encourage other 
countries to respect the Article 36(1) rights of U.S. citizens. 
Finally, adopting the ICJ’s interpretation of the treaty would show respect 
for the international community and could help restore this country’s 
 
 289. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 267, at 14 (discussing how records of the 
Honduran consulate could have verified that another man whom defense witnesses had identified 
at Bustillo’s trial as the true killer had fled to Honduras the day after the murder); Brief of 
Applicant, supra note 5, at 9 n.9 (discussing how Medellin’s court-appointed counsel, while 
preparing Medellin’s case for trial, was suspended from the practice of law for six months for his 
unethical behavior in another case). 
 290. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 267, at 3; Brief of Applicant, supra note 
5, at 10. 
 291. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2685, 2687. 
 292. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 497–98 (June 27). 
 293. See supra Part III. 
 294. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 3, at art. 36(2). 
 295. Quigley, supra note 161, at 52. 
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reputation as a defender of international law.  By repeatedly shirking its 
obligations under Article 36, the United States has damaged its relationships 
with other states in the international community.296  The Sanchez-Llamas Court 
did nothing to mend those rifts by rejecting the ICJ’s well-reasoned 
interpretation of Article 36. 
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